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The Influence of Liberalism in the
Definition of the Idea of the Nation
in India
Elena Valdameri
“Freedom is not merely the elimination of foreign
rule. To equate it with merely the recovery of our
national independence is to forget its more
positive aspects, more especially social and
economic freedom, freedom of thought, the
ensuring of our liberties in general, the
possibility of a rich, varied and full life for the
individual.”
K.M. Panikkar, The State and the Citizen1
 
Introduction
1 The purpose of this essay is to highlight how during the nineteenth and the first decade
of the twentieth century, in their search for freedom, educated Indians appropriated
and reshaped certain principles and values of the civilisation of their colonisers, the
British. In particular, I will try to explain the meaningful role played by liberalism in
dealing with the Empire and with the status of colonised in the Indian context. In doing
so,  I  will  take  into  account  Giorgio  Borsa’s  theory  of  modernisation2,  according  to
which, the phenomenon of re-working the key aspects of the thought of European and
American liberals was part of a wider, complex process of transformation of the Indian
society that the Indian intelligentsia undertook in order to challenge the hegemony of
the British Raj. In making this effort, Indians accepted some of the Western ideologies
and political theories that they regarded as essential elements of modernity. But the
exogenous principles and values had to be combined with the indigenous ones in order
to be legitimised. In other words, the acceptance of the ‘modern’ world needed to be
blended with Indian ‘tradition’ and culture so that the model of modernisation over-
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imposed by British colonialism could be challenged and a process of modernisation that
had  autonomous  characteristics  could  be  set  in  motion.  Thanks  to  this  creative
synthesis, a distinct identity from the one of the colonisers was created and different
ideas  of  the  nation  in  the  modern  meaning  of  the  sense  were  formulated.  Thus,
according  to  the  varying  combinations  of  Indian  and  European  ideas,  the
conceptualisation  of  the  nation  could  be  progressive,  open-mined,  embracing  new
values  and envisioning  a  secular state  and society  or,  on  the  contrary,  it  could  be
conservative, sectarian and rejecting Western values a priori. As I will attempt to show,
when some Indian nationalists incorporated liberal ideas in their thought in the light of
their tradition and cultural experience, they elaborated a new form of liberalism, that
emphasised collective identity and equality more than British liberalism did. Therefore,
against some current critiques that easily dismiss it as a mirror image of the ideas of
the British liberals, Indian liberalism contributed to give India a system of values that
were  conducive  for  the  construction  of  a  pluralistic  society  and  eventually  of
democracy. In the last part of the essay, Gopal Krishna Gokhale’s thought is chosen as a
significant example to understand the importance that some of the nineteenth-century
Indian nationalists attributed to certain Western values and to show how what was
imparted by the British as a mask of conquest could be adopted by the Indians as a
means to grasp, and then condemn, the colonial order.
 
Liberalism today
2 As  the  eminent  Italian  historian  Benedetto  Croce  maintained,  history  is  always
contemporary history: our interest in the past generally originates from the will  to
understand the problems of the present we are living in3. It is in this light that the new
attention kindled by liberalism is explainable. In a world extensively affected by the
neoliberal ideology, questioning the role of liberalism and its influence in the course of
history becomes quite natural to the scholar. Being liberating and limiting at the same
time, on the one hand claiming the freedom of the individual and on the other hand
fostering the acquisitive and possessive nature of that same individual, liberalism has
always attracted very strong likes and dislikes and has been equally attacked by the
right for being too extreme and by the left for not being radical enough.
3 Today, because of its stress on individualism and freedom vis-à-vis equality, liberalism
is often perceived as the ideological antecedent of the present unjust social order. Due
to its past exclusionary stands to the detriment of lower classes, liberalism is accused of
having been expression of the upper strata of society; again, in the ex-colonies it is seen
as the ideological ‘cover’ which allowed the imperialistic status quo to be preserved. In
a nutshell,  it  has become almost a commonplace to dismiss liberalism as something
superficial,  a  mask  for  the  hegemony of  the  privileged  classes,  if  not  as  a  ploy  to
horizontally spread Western dominance over the rest of the world. The fact that over
the  past  thirty  or  forty  years  political  and  economic  liberalisms  became  to  an
increasing extent fused in the form of neoliberalism made liberalism and equality seem
even  more  mutually  incompatible.  But  sweeping  generalisations  that  blame  the
contemporary neoliberal circumstances on liberal ideas overlook that, in the course of
history,  the  relationship  between  political  and  economic  liberalisms  has  not  been
constant. So, for example, in the first half of the twentieth century, various strands of
liberalism included both individual and social concerns and were able to accommodate
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a  certain  amount  of  social  equality.  Although  sharing  the  same  historical  roots,
liberalism  and  neoliberalism  should  be  distinguished,  in  order  to  counter  the
ideological argument that the latter is the revival of the former. As a matter of fact, the
main  difference  between  the  two  ideologies  is  that  neoliberalism  has  never  been
conceived as a liberating project.  The ideology of neoliberals,  who often distinguish
themselves for being sceptical of democracy, has retained only the economic liberal
ideas;  on the contrary,  it  has  not  incorporated the most  emancipatory elements  of
political  liberalism,  as  indicated  by  the  fact  that  it  is  increasingly  linked  with  the
authoritarian use of state power. 
4 It  is  undeniable  that,  since  the  beginning,  liberal  ideas  presented  terrible
contradictions  and,  for  a  long  time,  were  not  concerned  with  the  expansion  of
democracy to the the lower social classes and women, or with the extension of freedom
to  ‘backward  peoples’.  However,  this  is  not  a  good  enough  reason  for  rejecting
liberalism in  toto and letting it  disappear in the shadow of the dominant neoliberal
ideology. It is, in fact, misleading to consider liberalism as something immutable in the
course of  time:  liberalism  developed  across  four  hundred  years  of  human  history,
during which it had to come to grips with different political problems, according to the
historical period and to the cultural peculiarities of the countries in which it  grew.
Even  when  the  socio-political  conditions  were  similar,  the  responses  that  liberal
thinkers gave to the same problems were different, and sometimes contrasting. Several
scholars  have  even  wondered  whether  liberalism  rather  than  being  considered  a
unified ideology, should not be seen as a set of different, although parent ideologies.
This is a position which is based on the perception of how labile are the outlines and
variable the premises of liberalism as an ideology. Yet, if it is certainly a mistake to see
liberalism as a homogenous bloc and not to take into account its specificities in the
different  historical  contexts,  it  would be equally  wrong not  to  emphasise  what  the
several  liberal  currents  have  in  common.  For  liberalism,  as  Norberto  Bobbio
maintained, is predicated on the assumption of the Enlightenment philosophy that the
individual,  the rational  being,  has  inalienable and indefeasible  rights  that  the state
must not violate4. Ergo, the various strands of liberalism share a common denominator:
the desire to safeguard the innate right of the individual against political power. This
principle cannot be easily thrown in the garbage dump of history, since it had a major
impact  on several  societies  at  different times and keeps being a  relevant source of
action and thought.
5 Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  liberal  ideas  remain a  live  question today is  not  always
acknowledged. On the one hand, liberalism is positively evaluated and regarded as a
vitally-needed political  and doctrinal  element in the history of  humankind5.  On the
other  hand,  liberalism  is  rejected  as  the  real  culprit  for  past  and  present  global
injustice. In particular, some criticism of the liberal ideology is in tune with certain
‘postmodern’ approaches which reduce universal  and non-negotiable values such as
democracy, human rights, promotion of reason, tolerance and progress to the level of
relative values. These principles are ridiculed as ‘imperialist categories’ only because
they were initially  formulated in  Europe.  Liberalism is  thus  seen as  the ideological
‘cover’ for imperialism and inequality. Yet, such currents of thought are unconvincing
for two main reasons. From the political point of view, they can be very dangerous
since they deny the possibility  of  building societies  predicated on universal  human
rights.  And this signifies the negation of what Hobsbawm called “the project of the
eighteenth century Enlightenment6”,  that is  the renunciation to the most liberating
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aspects of liberalism. From the historical point of view, these trends deny the fact that,
in some circumstances,  liberal  ideas offered a powerful  critique of  imperialism and
turned into an ideological instrument of resistance.
 
Giorgio Borsa’s theory of modernisation
6 At this point, it is expedient to draw attention to India. Also in the Indian anglophone
academic arena, some are not immune from treating Enlightenment and modernity as
enemies  to  be  deconstructed  and  displaced7.  This  stand  is  ascribable  to  the
understandable fact that some Indian intellectuals consider a mission to substitute the
Eurocentric  vision  of  history  with  an  Asiacentric  one8.  Nonetheless,  if  some of  the
nationalist  and  marxist  historians’  arguments9 challenge  certain  orientalist
historiographical stereotypes that persist in European and American academia and that
see Westernisation as the only acceptable model of modernisation, the main weakness
of the Asiacentric approach is that it corroborates the dichotomisation of the world in
‘West’ and ‘East’. This makes difficult to understand the origins of the modern world
and,  moreover,  to  see  how  the  cultural  and  intellectual  connections  between the
several parts of the globe have developed in the course of history. 
7 For this purpose, Giorgio Borsa’s theory of modernisation, although initially formulated
about fifty years ago, remains a very useful intellectual instrument and interpretative
model to explain the history of the transformation of Asian societies as the outcome of
the encounter with European civilisation through colonialism10.  According to Borsa,
from a certain point onwards, modernisation in India, and more generally in Asia, was
not an external imposition. Instead, it became a conscious will, an endogenous process
motivated by the need to elaborate an indigenous idea of modernity. Therefore, the
modern world was the result of two dialectic moments: on the one hand, European
domination and, on the other hand, the Asian reaction to it11. So, modernisation was
seen by Borsa as a process of exchange and interaction and not as a phenomenon that,
originated in Europe, reproduced itself identically in the civilisations with which it got
in contact. In other words, this view rejects the argument - still very popular in certain
academic environments - that modernisation is inherently European, an expression of
the Western civilisation and, as such, it manifested itself always and everywhere with
European characteristics. For modernisation is not a ‘liquid’12 that can be transferred
from a civilisation to the other, since it acquires local cultural peculiarities according to
the historical experience and cultural background of the different civilisations of the
world.
8 Hence,  in  the  light  of  such  theory,  it  becomes  clear  that,  against  certain  biased
historiography, to regard ‘East’ and ‘West’ as divided and opposed does not contribute
to investigate the intellectual history of India: such a perspective underestimates the
history of political thought, for it would be very difficult to explain its role in colonial
India  if  not  as  a  process  of  fruitful  combination  of  ideas  coming  from  different
intellectual strands. In fact, as Sanjay Subrahmanyan explains Indian history can be
easily described as “a crossroads,  where not only did regions and regional  cultures
influence one another, but things came and went from far more distant lands, whether
Europe, Central Asia and East Africa13”. India was never sealed off from the rest of the
world and its people, not differently from other peoples in the rest of the world, have
always been “ready to assimilate anything useful that came from anywhere14”. 
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9 As a consequence of  the penetration of British colonialism and the diffusion of  the
English language,  the Indian intelligentsia came in contact with new ideas,  towards
which  they  adopted  an  open-minded  approach.  The  European  economic,  political,
judicial,  cultural  ideas  and  practices  hastened  the  disintegration  of  the  traditional
society and spurred a  process  of  transformation of  which Indians were not  passive
objects.  In  fact,  Indian  intellectuals,  under  the  impact  of  the  Western  culture
appropriated themselves of new intellectual tools whereby they could rediscover, re-
assess, criticise, and reformulate their own cultural tradition. But this re-elaboration
started from the awareness that, in order to transform Indian society, it was necessary
to accept new values, principles, ideologies, and political theories. Among these, there
were the ideas  of  the American and French Revolution such as  nationality,  liberty,
unity, representative institutions, namely concepts that Indians increasingly perceived
as universally desirable. At a later stage, the same ideas would be at the basis of the
judgment condemning the modus operandi of the colonial regime and articulating the
intellectual framework of nationalism. 
10 The construction of Indian national identity, thus, originated from this compromise
between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’: the results were different because the relationship
between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ was mutable. Yet, all the ideologies that developed
from  such  variable  synthesis  represented  autochthonous  and  original  ideas  of
modernity: they were far from being merely emulative. So, also the intellectuals that
took an anti-modern and anti-British stand accommodated exogenous ideas in their
ideology  and  advocated  their  own  notion  of  modernity.  In  the  same  way,  the
formulation of the conceptualisation of the nation, irrespective of its foundations, was
a modern phenomenon: it implied the ‘rediscovery’ of Indian tradition in the light of
new ideas and new needs. The nation was defined in the modern sense of the term,
drawing both from indigenous, ‘traditional’ elements and from European ones. But this
process of adoption and adaption of the latter to the Indian context was not always
acknowledged  by  the  Indian  ideologues,  who  often  tried  to  show  that  elements  of
modernity had already existed in the Indian tradition,  and then ideas coming from
outside were redundant15.
11 Therefore,  any  schematic  and  homogenising  interpretation  of  the  factual  and
intellectual  history  of  nationalism  is  not  self-explanatory.  Indian  nationalism  was
always multifarious, for it was composed by several strands that envisioned different,
often diverging, ideas of the nation. Depending on the particular blend of European and
Indian ideas, the conceptualisations of the nation varied. For instance, while refusing
Mazzini’s  violent  methods,  Gopal  Krishna  Gokhale  embraced  the  libertarian  and
voluntaristic elements of the Italian thinker’s idea of the nation and combined them
with Indian traditional multiculturalism and the social reformism of the Maharashtrian
liberals.  On  the  contrary,  Bal  Gangadhar  Tilak  rejected  the  most  liberal  aspects  of
Mazzini’s thought, whereas he adopted his cult of the nation and fused it with some
Hindu and Vedic unifying myths: the result was a fusion of radical politics and social
reaction.  So,  there  were  different  and  conflicting  strands  within  the  anti-colonial
movement and,  in contrast  with what secular nationalist  historians maintain,  some
were religious, community-based and discriminatory16. Thus, patterns of inclusion or
exclusion, democratic or undemocratic principles, equality or disability are to be found
in Indian nationalism from its beginning: since the nineteenth century, intolerant and
exclusionary ideas of the nation were organic in Indian political discourse as much as
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liberal ideas of the nation. Even though there is no idea of the nation intrinsically more
legitimate or authentic than another, the fact remains that these ideas can and must be
judged by considering their  social  consequences in terms of  peace,  democracy,  and
inclusion. When, on the one hand, the Marxist and ‘postmodern’ views17 see the anti-
colonial movement as an altogether bourgeois phenomenon and, on the other hand,
the nationalist historiography18 treats all Indian nationalists as saints, they attain an
ideological reductio ad unum of the different conceptualisation of the nation. Further,
since these ideas’ different social consequences are swept aside, such historiographical
perspectives hardly provide any explanation for the political and social crises of the
last century of Indian history19.
12 Also  the  so-called  Cambridge  school  interpretation  does  not  help  emphasise  the
significance and nature of the principles that informed Indian nationalism. In fact, the
exponents of this distinguished historiographical school did not attribute any social
relevance  to  the  Indian  ‘middle  class’.  In  their  opinion,  educated  Indians  had  no
autonomous political project, since they were acting as clients of powerful notables. So
this  interpretation  reduced  the  ideas of  the  protagonists  of  the  anti-colonial
movement, deprived of any weight, to a political expedient for the realisation of the
individual self-interest. As a result, the nationalist ideology, voided of any autonomy,
was only an awkward imitation, nay, a travesty, of European nationalism20. Contrary to
this argument, my contention is that the educated Indian ‘middle class’ had a notable
social influence, since it became the carrier of a modern and rationalist outlook and, as
such, was a crucial  agent of modernisation. But in order to acknowledge this,  a re-
evaluation of Indian intellectual history that shows, inter alia, the notable role played
by liberalism in the evolution of Indian political thought, is necessary. 
 
Liberalism as a ‘conjunctural phenomenon’
13 Therefore, my essay wants to be a contribution to such works as those of Christopher A.
Bayly, Sugata Bose, Andrew Sartori21. These confirm that the use of the liberal ideology
in the subcontinent was a “conjunctural phenomenon rather than simply a lineage or
influence diffused from Europe to Asia, from metropole to colony. It reflected attempts
by people – not all of them elite – to grapple with the consequences of globalisation, the
intrusion of colonial state and the collapse of embodied authority of popes, mandarins,
or Brahmins which had all happened within a generation22”. Such sophisticated works
substantiate what Borsa maintained in the 1960s and 1970s, that is to say that ideas
moved freely in the space of the Empire and Indians – but the same can be said of the
inhabitants of other colonies – were not passive receivers of ready-made concepts and
much less that the intellectuals in the colonies were clumsily aping their dominators.
As a result,  the old misconception of the ‘centre’ setting in motion a unidirectional
process of change in the ‘periphery’ is disputed, since colonialism appears as a realm
where mutual contamination and exchange were possible.
14 Nevertheless, note must be taken that the emphasis on globalism does not necessitate
“circumvent[ing] the narratives of the nation and the Empire that have constrained
scholarship and militated against the interrogation of ideas and their purposes within
the South Asian context23”. Rather, it draws our attention to the crucial role played by
ideas in the conceptualisation of the different versions of nation as the intellectual and
political tool for the liberation of the colonised. As a matter of fact, the adoption of
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liberal principles in the Indian context contributed to the definition of an inclusive idea
of nation vis-à-vis an exclusive one. As seen above, the latter was as much informed by
European and indigenous ideas as the former. Thus, the way in which liberalism was
appropriated  in  British  India  is  useful  for  understanding  how  it  was  adapted  and
utilised according to the needs of the Indian intelligentsia and how it served, at a later
stage, not only as the ideological foundation for the anti-colonial movement, but also as
a programme for social action against creed, caste and gender inequalities.
15 No doubt, these processes of cultural appropriation were linked to the violence always
inherent in the building of Empires and, more specifically, in the ‘power-knowledge’
logic of  colonialism. In fact,  as  Christopher Bayly has shown in his work Recovering
Liberties. Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, the Indian context was utterly
different from the European one and the starting point for the reflection on liberalism
was the condemnation of state violence and not, as was the case in Europe, the problem
of intellectual freedom24. An enlightening example is that the eminent Bengali thinker
and reformer, Rammohan Roy, used to cite Grotius and other British liberal authors to
decry the violation of  treatises  and the misappropriation of  land by the East  India
Company25. Indian newspapers did not miss a chance to note that the strict censorship
imposed over the native press was a practice quite opposite to the precept of freedom
guaranteed in England26. Again, the introduction of self-government was demanded by
Gopal Krishna Gokhale as a response to Lord Curzon’s oppressive rule27. 
16 Thanks  to  the  diffusion  of  the  ‘imperial  language’  and  the  promotion  of  English
education, not only were Indian intellectuals provided with a means of interregional
consolidation and with a common platform of thought, but they were also included in
an ‘international public sphere’. Indians had realised much before the 1835 Bentick
resolution that learning English was a extraordinary achievement,  since it  provided
them not only with new opportunities of decent jobs in the colonial administration, but
also with an interpretative key through which they could more readily make sense of
the new socio-political  reality that was taking shape in India28.  In a world that was
rapidly changing, new knowledge was necessary and learning English allowed Indians
to have access to it. In fact, Indian intellectuals readily realised the global relevance of
the 18th and 19th century revolutionary movements in France, Spain, Portugal,  Latin
America  and  Italy.  Not  surprisingly,  the  British  were  quite troubled.  They  were
particularly anxious about the influence of the French Revolution, not only because the
memory of it being a threat for the British Empire persisted, but also because they were
aware that its egalitarian ideals were much more difficult to vanquish than any army.
As a consequence, Fort St. William College was founded in 1800 with the main aim to
become a bulwark against the erroneous principles of the Revolution. The depiction of
Hinduism as a hierarchical religion became part of the project of propagating a social
and political model of global inequality29.
17 Rammohan Roy, generally described as the father of the Bengal Renaissance, was the
first eminent example of a cosmopolitan intellectual. Known also in Europe, Roy was a
public  man,  deeply  involved in  the  debates  that  were  emerging at  the  global  level
around  constitutional  liberalism.  He  was  committed  in  the  spread  of  liberal  ideas
through the press, both in English and in Bengali, in order to create awareness among
an Indian public opinion in the making. Roy appreciated the importance of modernity
for  the  reform  of  society  and  was  therefore  an  advocate  of  the  introduction  of  a
modern curriculum of  studies for Indian students.  He maintained that the study of
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ancient  texts  and Sanskrit  was  not  suitable  for  the  understanding  of  the  changing
world and promoted the adoption in the fledgling Indian school system of subjects such
as history of Europe and India, geography, philosophy, geometry and arithmetic. Yet, in
Roy’s  opinion,  modernity  did  not  imply  the  abandonment  of  tradition.  Rather,  it
needed  to  be  combined  with  tradition.  So,  a  greater  emphasis  on  reason  did  not
necessitate  rejecting religion.  In  fact,  influenced by  Christian humanitarianism,  the
founder of the Brahmo Samaj wanted to purify Hinduism of evil practices, like sati and
child marriage, and make it more ethical and rational. Moreover, Roy gave historical
corroboration to his demands for a constitution, for a free press, and for juries where
his countrymen could serve. In fact, he wanted to demonstrate that, by invoking the
introduction of such fundamental safeguards against the despotic and corrupt rule of
the  East  India  Company,  he  was  not  asking  for  alien  institutions,  because,  on  the
contrary,  these  had  already  been  part  of  ancient  India.  They  simply  needed  to  be
revived according to spirit of the time30. 
18 Also in the opinion of eminent social reformists like Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar
and Mahadev Govind Ranade31, espousing the principles of rationalism, Enlightenment
and Humanism, did not run against India’s own culture. Engaged in the effort to give
dignity  to  the  individual  vis-à-vis  the  dictates  of  the  castes,  Bhandarkar  found  an
historical justification for social reform, claiming that custom and religion were two
different things and that, as a consequence, the old religious texts had to be interpreted
according  to  the  requirements  of  the  times.  Ranade  agreed  with  this  ‘method  of
tradition’ and tried to corroborate the importance of social reforms by using scriptural
citations and the egalitarian teachings of the saint-poets of the bhakti tradition 32.  In
polemic  with  the  European  critics  who  considered  the  ‘oriental  races’  doomed  to
backwardness and even extinction unless they made way for the western spirit of social
emancipation and religion, Ranade maintained that it was a peculiarity of the history of
India to be reinvigorated after all invasions. In fact, “the nation (…) after a temporary
submerging under the floods of foreign influences, has reared up its head – absorbing
all that is best in the alien civilisation and polity and religions33”. That process had
always been a catalyser towards social evolution. In the same way, it would not be a
break with the past, provided that the longed-for change “from credulity to faith, (...)
from status to contract, from authority to reason, from organised to unorganised life,
from bigotry to toleration, from blind fatalism to a sense of human dignity34” occurred
respecting the Indian cultural tradition. These reformists did not idealise the past, but
relied on history to validate their projects of social reformation. The approach adopted
by Ranade and Bhandarkar, while being a strategic way to involve the masses, was part
of  that  wider  process  of  societal  reconstruction  on  the  basis  of  the  re-working  of
European ideas in the light of their local traditions: it is a clear example of the way
Indians were shaping their own model of modernity by creatively intermingling values
coming from their own tradition and values coming from the European one35.
19 The  selective  appropriation  by  Indian  intellectuals  of  the  thought  of  the  most
representative  liberal  thinkers  must  be  inserted  in  this  intellectual  framework.
Liberalism was not uncritically embraced, but adopted in such a way that it best fitted
with the Indian demand for political and social inclusion. For instance, Aurobindo Gosh
did not neglect to notice the limits of the French Revolution besides its undoubtable
emancipatory  aspects.  According  to  the  Bengali  intellectual,  freedom  and  equality
would remain exterior, mechanical and unfounded without a change in the psyche of
the  people36.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  John  Stuart  Mill  considered  liberty  as
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unsuitable for the barbarians, that is to say for the inhabitants of the colonies, was not
even  questioned  by  the  Indians,  but  simply  ignored,  whereas  Mill’s  stress  on  self-
government  and  education  as  means  of  progress  was  included  in  their  discourse37.
Again, those elements of liberalism that were not functional for the welfare of India
were  criticised  and  rejected.  So,  individualism  was  compensated  with  a  greater
attention to society and community, whereas the concept of secularism, as approved by
the  1887  Indian  National  Congress,  stressed  the  need  on  the  part  of  the  state  to
safeguard the balance among the different religious communities rather than being a
political project aimed at over-imposing the creation of a secularised society38. 
20 Note must also be taken of how the work of Edmund Burke was received in India. The
well-known Reflections on the French Revolution39 became very popular in Indian colleges
because  the  British  considered  it  appropriate  to  counteract  the  effect  of  the
revolutionary ideals.  But  Burke’s  stand on the French Revolution was not  the  only
reason why the Irish philosopher captivated educated Indians. In fact, Burke had dealt
with India during his long membership in the British Parliament and had compiled
several parliamentary reports on the colony. He was deeply concerned with the nature
of the Empire, which, in his view, was no less oppressive and violent than the French
Revolution, since it had no respect for the previous social order of India. In Burke’s
words, the British colonisers, like the Jacobins, were incapable of transforming "the
crude  and  ferocious  impulses  of  conquest  into  the  nobler  and  more  sympathetic
sentiments that link parents and children40”. It is true that Burke’s condemnation of
the Empire originated from his anxieties that the East India Company parvenus, after
having accumulated a huge wealth in India – Robert Clive was a notorious example –
could become members of Parliament and achieve social pre-eminence, regardless of
hierarchy,  traditional  values  or  freedom41.  However,  Burke  was  also  sincerely
sympathetic with the people of  India.  Unlike both James and John Stuart Mills  and
other liberal thinkers, he thought that they were entitled to freedom, because freedom
was attainable by all who desired it. What is more, Burke differed from John Seeley and
John Strachey,  because,  unlike them, he recognised that  all  peoples  had a  sense of
nationality and a sense of belonging to a territory, a natural feeling, but denied by the
Empire42. Therefore, it is not difficult to appreciate why Burke was an important source
of inspiration for the Indian intelligentsia. 
21 Burke represented a partial exception43 to the process of transformation of liberal ideas
that, as shown by Mehta in his work on liberalism and Empire, was taking place in
Great Britain. In the birthplace of liberalism, in fact, ideas that were supposed to have
universal  had  the  tendency  to  mutate  in  ambivalent  and contradictory  ways  when
getting in contact with the ‘unfamiliar’, namely with civilisations, that in the eyes of
the British liberals, were backward and benighted. So, for instance, the interpretation
of history differed according to the context to which it was applied; in the modern,
rational West, history unfolded along the forward-looking line of progress, whereas in
the other-worldly East, history was cyclical and entrapped in a timeless languor, until
change and evolution were set in motion thanks to the encounter with Europe44. More
importantly, according to the judgemental posture of liberal thinkers, the enjoyment of
freedom was not suitable for backward peoples. Backward societies were languishing in
a  state  of  lethargy,  because  they  did  not  possess  the  mental,  cultural,  and  social
preconditions to align themselves with progress. In the course of history, they had not
been able to elaborate the concept of liberty and had thus remained excluded from the
march of progress. Incapable of thinking of freedom, a fortiori they were unfit to enjoy
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it. This eternal torpor could be broken up only by the penetration of an external force.
In this way, colonial power was justified as the factor that could bring material and
moral  amelioration to the peoples  that  had not  been blessed by progress;  it  would
provide them with the instruments of advancement so that they could finally achieve
freedom  in  an  undefined  and  far  away  future.  This  was  the  civilising  mission  of
colonialism. In fact, according to the liberal outlook, the colonised status of the peoples
was just temporary and would come to an end once such peoples would be ready for the
achievement of freedom. However, when this day would come was never specified. In
John  Stuart  Mill’s  view,  Canada,  New  Zealand,  and  Australia  had  populations  of
“European  races”  and  had  reached  a  stage  of  civilisation  similar  to  the  English.
Therefore,  they  were  ready  for  representative  government.  On  the  contrary,  other
colonies,  such as  India,  whose population was barbarous and uncivilised would not
attain freedom for a long time. Here colonialism had to be benevolently authoritarian.
Thus,  the  concept  of  liberty  as  a  universally-sought  and  longed-for  value  was
reconsidered and restricted to the advanced cultures. Liberal ideas became ambiguous,
temporising, parochial. They denied equality and provided imperialism with a moral
apologia. They failed to wield their liberating influence and turned into an ideology of
oppression.
22 When, by the 1870s, Indian intellectuals started to ask for a greater participation in the
administration and in the Councils,  they were just demanding those political  rights
which,  according  to  the  British  liberal  tradition,  they  were  entitled  to.  The liberal
principles which, putatively, animated the foreign rulers were the same that inspired
the founders of the Indian National Congress, who initially did not adopt a nationalist
ideology, but were willing to help ameliorate the colonial rule by providing the Indian
viewpoint and competence. Nonetheless, the scientific analysis of the political economy
of  the  colonial  state  by  eminent  scholars  like  Mahadev  Govind  Ranade,  Dadabhai
Naoroji,  Romesh Chandra Dutt,  Ganesh V. Joshi and, at a later stage,  Gopal Krishna
Gokhale unveiled the predatory nature of the British rule. Their studies demonstrated
that  the  Raj did  not  care  for  the  Indian  people’s  welfare,  since  its  aim  was  the
systematic  draining of  the resources of  the subcontinent to the advantage of  Great
Britain and the creation of a market for British industrial products. After pointing out
the specific characteristics of Indian reality, these ‘dissenting economists’ started to
criticise  the  existing  liberal  economic  paradigms  and  confuted  that  they  could  be
universally  applicable.  Thus,  in  their  opinion,  the  principle  of  laissez-faire  was
inadmissible in a weak economy such as the Indian one, where the state had to be both
the guardian of the economic interests of the masses and the representative of the
national will45. Moreover, in the opinion of the Indian critics of the Raj, free trade was a
justification of the dominance of Great Britain over its colonies, so much so that they
asked for economic protectionism. The Ricardian theory of rent, according to which the
state in India played the role of landlord and had rights over the rent of the soil, was
rejected and considered preposterous.  Also the Malthusian explanation that blamed
famines on overpopulation was rejected, because – it was argued – poverty in India was
a man-made problem, a consequence of the land tax imposed by the colonial state46.
Eventually,  nationalist  economic  thought  was  unified  within  the  framework  of  the
“drain theory”, articulated by Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh Chunder Dutt47. The drain
theory, which explained the state of poverty and dependence of India in such a way
that every man could understand it, made people aware of the fact that their condition
of  degradation  was  the  result  of  foreign  domination.  Therefore,  Indian  economic
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nationalists were the first to elaborate a comprehensive critique of colonialism, which
would  provide  the  ideological  foundations  of  the  anti-colonial  movement  for  the
following century. 
23 By and large, there were several reasons why Indians at this stage of history found
liberalism  to  be  appealing.  Substantially,  it  provided  them  with  the  political
justification for the articulation of a nationalist discourse. In fact, the very foundations
of  liberalism could  not  condone imperialism,  not  only  because imperialism implied
oppression  by  the  state,  but  also  because,  from  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth
century,  the  colonial  discourse  had  been  imbued  with  racism.  So,  it  was  no  more
possible for Indians to be redeemed thanks to the assimilation of the more advanced
Western  culture,  since  race  made  them  permanently  inferior.  Indians,  being  the
‘others’ to the British, demanded their own national rights.
24 In  addition,  liberalism,  with  its  emphasis  on education,  freedom and progress,  was
useful  as  a  social  programme  to  fight  against  those  internal  differences  and
inequalities, such as caste rigidities, communalism and a patriarchic order for which
the colonial state could not be entirely blamed. Creating a fairer society rested on an
overall  change of  the  Indian mentality  and could  be  achieved by  finding  a  fruitful
compromise between being an individual and being part of a certain community and by
considering every human being,  regardless of  caste,  religion and gender,  worthy of
respect  and  capable  of  moral,  political,  social  and  economic  progress.  But  the
nineteenth-century social reformers were aware of the fact that it was a long process,
as changes of mentality always are. That is why they were captivated by the concept of
gradualism,  so  common  in  liberal  thought.  The  conviction  that  change  had  to  be
gradual was shared by all the Congress’ founders. Social and economic development, in
their view, were as important as freedom from British rule, but the two aims had to be
brought together,  because a free nation could not be founded on caste,  gender and
economic inequalities48.  That is  why the Congressmen believed in the emancipatory
effect  of self-government.  In  fact,  the  progressive  extension  of  democracy  would
contribute to overcome the traditional social divisions, allowing a sense of common
good and citizenship to be developed. In this sense, in the Indian context, the state
should have an active role in creating freedom and equal opportunities; in the Indian
reading,  liberalism  was  not  only  absence  of  coercion  by  others,  but  it  had  also  a
constructive, positive drive49.
25 Ultimately,  the  social  moderation  inherent  in  liberalism  suited  the  way  Indian
intellectuals envisioned society. In fact, they were a small social group, mainly coming
from the urban bourgeoisie and the higher castes. Even though, as a rule, they were not
wealthy,  they were better-off  compared to the poverty-stricken masses of peasants.
According  to  traditional  Indian  culture,  they  perceived  society  as  an  organic,
harmonious body, of which certain parts were fitter to occupy certain positions. So,
even when they were in favour of the elevation of the masses, they did not want to
rouse them against the colonial  regime, since that would have perturbed the social
equilibrium. For instance, according to Gokhale, “the sense of responsibility required
for the proper exercise of the political institutions of the West can be acquired by an
Eastern people through practical training and experiment only50”. In other words, in the
process of transformation of Indian society a sense of continuity and moderation was
necessary  not  to  lose  trace  of  India’s  own  past  and  tradition,  on  which  the  new
institutions had to be accommodated. 
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26 Gokhale,  disciple of  Ranade,  did not neglect the fact  that political  freedom without
social freedom was inconsistent and weak. He understood that a powerful tool for the
empowerment of  the  masses  was  education  and  he  fought  to  make  it  free  and
compulsory at the primary level so that the conditions of the lower strata of society
could be improved:
If you want to increase the wage earning capacity of the workmen, if you want the
peasant  to  grow  stronger  and  healthier  and  take  better care  of  himself  and
understand his dealings with money lender and understand better his benefits of
sanitation and agriculture,  then compulsion alone had been proved effective  in
spreading education51.
27 Unfortunately, Gokhale’s Education Bill was defeated also by the opposition of some
nationalist  leaders,  in  primis  Tilak  and  his  party,  the  so-called  Extremists.  What  is
interesting here is that the clash on the issue of an inclusionary education points out
very clearly that those who fought for political freedom were not necessarily fighting
also for  social  freedom52.  In  fact,  the attitude towards the spread of  education is  a
litmus test by which it is possible to understand what kind of nation the Indian leaders
were imagining. As Parimala Rao argues: “the attempt to deny education to the poor,
lower  castes,  and  women  ran  parallel  to  the  unequivocal  demand  for  political
independence by the same leaders. This leads to the question: Whose nation did they
represent? (…) Was their demand for freedom aimed at essentially reinforcing a pre-
modern  feudal  order  or  to  build  a  modern  nation  state  based  on  democratic
principles53?”
 
Gokhale’s idea of the nation
28 Gokhale’s  ideas  are  worth  considering  more  closely54.  Thanks  to  the  popularity
acquired as leader of the Indian National Congress, Gokhale could provide the all-India
organisation with an ‘authoritative statement’ to show the world what Indians were
suffering  and  what  they  wanted.  He  was,  in  fact,  the  first  Indian  politician  and
intellectual who elaborated a well-structured idea of the nation, predicated upon the
application of the liberal principles which had been circulating in India for a century.
The  Gokhalean  idea  of  the  nation  encompassed  the  main  elements  of  the  British
political  tradition  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  namely  territorial
unity, liberty and self-government. Among others, in Gokhale’s opinion, John Stuart
Mill had played an important part in moulding the ‘new India55’. Even though certain
aspects of his thought were ignored because prejudiced against Asian societies, Mill’s
influence  is  very  much  felt  in  the  speeches  of  Gokhale.  But  Gokhale’s  sources  of
inspirations were not only British. For instance, the argumentations made by Friedrich
List in his National System of Political Economy56 found their way in some of the Budget
speeches delivered by Gokhale in the Imperial Legislative Council57. Furthermore, List
clearly  formulated  the  liberal  concept  that  a  nation,  in  order  to  have  historical
justification,  had  to  be  of  a  certain  size58;  this  was  an  assertion  which  Indian
nationalists, with their emphasis on territory, concurred with. But what is particular
important in Gokhale’s thought was the individual’s will as part of the nation in the
making. This concept was essential in the model of nation of Giuseppe Mazzini59. As a
matter of fact, the Italian Risorgimento thinker held a fascination on Indians because
the context in which he had operated appeared very similar to the Indian one. In other
words, Italy, like India, having been divided in regional states for centuries, was a very
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heterogeneous polity;  like  India,  it  had  been  sacrificed  in  name  of  imperialism.
Therefore, Mazzini underlined the importance of building the nation by looking at a
common better future. Freedom was the only bond that would unite the people into a
single  whole.  In  other  words,  the  lack  of  objective  elements  of  cohesion  would  be
overcome thanks  to  the  commitment  to  build  a  free  nation.  In  Mazzini’s  thinking,
nationalism thus had to be transformed in a sort of secular and humanising religion:
the national mission became a mission of divine origin, which did not clash with being
part of the universal humankind. The Mazzinian inspiration is easily brought to our
mind by the words of Gokhale:
The growth, during the last fifty years, of a feeling of common nationality, based
upon common tradition, common disabilities and common hopes and aspirations,
has  been  most  striking.  The  fact  that  we  are  Indians  first,  and  Hindoos,
Mahomedans,  Parsees  and  Christians  afterwards,  is  being  realised  in  a  steadily
increasing measure […]. Public life must be spiritualised. Love of country must so
fill  the heart that all  else shall appear as of little moment by its side. A fervent
patriotism which rejoices at every opportunity of sacrifice for the motherland, a
dauntless heart which refuses to be turned back from its object by difficulty or
danger, a deep faith in the purpose Providence that nothing can shake – equipped
with these, the worker must start on his mission and reverently seek the joy which
comes of spending oneself in the service of one’s country60.
29 The ‘worker’ was, in Gokhale’s outlook, the educated Indian, ‘the brain of the nation’.
These Indians had ‘cleared the jungle’ and laid the foundations for the future work of
political education and national advancement. Thanks to them, ‘the idea of a united
and renovated India’ was no more an ‘idle dream of a few imaginative minds61’. Thus
the role of education was double: it was pivotal as an instrument of social emancipation
and in creating national consciousness.
30 Gokhale was aware of the fact that his national project could be accomplished only in
the long run, along an arduous path, because the individual will of being part of the
nation  had  to  be  built  and  enforced  through  a  process  of  political  and  social
maturation, in which both mass education and self-government should play a seminal
role. So, he maintained:
Let us clearly bear in mind that any progress that we make as a people must now be
on a democratic basis (…). And for this purpose, it is not a few towering individuals
that will suffice, but the average strength of the mass of the people must be raised62.
31 An  important  turning  point  in  the  development  of  Gokhale’s  thinking  was  the
government  of  Lord  Curzon.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Indian  leader,  Lord  Curzon’s
mandate,  comparable  only  with  Aurangzeb’s  despotic  rule,  had  made  it  clear  that
‘equality  [between  British  and  Indians  as  per  the  proclamation  of  the  British
Parliament in 1833] has been a mere legal fiction63’. In fact:
Lord Curzon, who dearly loves debating, thought it proper to attack the educated
classes in regard to their constant reference to this Proclamation. He said in effect:
“You base your claim for equality in the Queen’s proclamation. But what does it
promise you? It says that you will have equality when you are ‘qualified’ for it. Now,
here we have certain qualifications which can only be attained by heredity or race.
Therefore,  as  you  cannot  acquire  race,  you  really  cannot  have  equality  with
Englishmen in India as long as British rule lasts”. Now (…) look at the unwisdom,
the  stupendous  unwisdom,  of  the  whole  thing,  telling  the  people  of  India  that
unless  they  were  content  to  remain  permanently  a  subject  race  in  their  own
country, their interests and those of the British rule were not identical. After this,
how  can  any  Englishman  complain  if  my  countrymen  regarded,  as  they  have
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latterly regarding, your rule in India as maintained, not to promote their interests,
but for a selfish purpose64?
32 By and large, in Lord Curzon’s view, liberty was not “a factor of human progress65”, at
least not for the subject race. The disdain and contempt that British had towards India
was justified by the fact that in the past “we [Indians] have shown no disposition to
quarrel with despotic forms of government66”. Ultimately, Gokhale found this view to
be morally and politically unacceptable. He explained:
We could put up with it under the Mughals and in the Native states, because it was
their  form of  government.  They  did  not  rule  us  in  one  way and themselves  in
another. But it is not your method and you cannot apply it to us without despising
us67.
33 Therefore, Curzon’s rule was a negation of the liberal principles which, as England had
professed,  would  enable  the  Indian  people  to  govern  themselves  according  to  the
higher standards  of  the West68.  It  represented a  dramatic  change of  course for  the
British policy until then pursued in India and embodied the triumph of centralisation
and  bureaucratisation  of  the  Indian  political  system.  Moreover,  it  excluded  the
educated  classes,  who  alone  were  the  real  spokesmen  and  public  opinion  of  the
country. In short, it was not a responsible mode of governance, since nobody could be
identified with the interests of the Indian people. Gokhale saw in the worsening of the
political  situation  a  consequence  of  the  consolidation  of  the  colonial  power;  the
officials, supported by a well-structured and modern apparatus, did not need anymore
the approval of the people and could show the real face of their domination69. What is
more, not only had economic oppression turned into a permanent characteristic of the
colonial rule, but also racial discrimination had become a systematic phenomenon, so
much so that Indians had to live in a constant ‘atmosphere of inferiority70’.  Racism
towards Indians, both in the subcontinent and in South Africa, had become so pervasive
that Indian people started to define themselves as the victims of that racial attitude71.
So, in 1897, referring to the conditions of Indians in South Africa, Gokhale wrote that
“after all, we are only British slaves, and not British subjects, and that it is idle on our
part  to  expect  justice  or  fair  treatment  where  it  does  not  suit  the  interest  of
Englishmen to be just  or fair72”.  It  was a folly,  he said,  to imagine that liberty and
equality, the moral principles that occupied ‘so prominent a place in the early creed of
French  Revolution’  could  be  gifted  by  one  nation  to  another73.  The  colonial  racial
posture  became  a  criterion  for  the  judgement  of  British  attitudes  towards  their
subjects. Deprived of its aura of benevolence, the despotic and racist British rule had
turned into a violent midwife and could no longer vindicate a moral superiority over
India and the eastern world in general. This realisation legitimised the revisitation of
the orientalistic vision of history, namely the forced-upon image of a changeless and
unresisting East. That traditional view:
[C]ould  not  go  on  forever,  and  the  protest  of  the  Eastern  world  against  it,  as
evidenced by the steady growth of a feeling of national self-respect in different
Eastern  lands  has  now  gathered  sufficient  strength  and  volume  to  render  its
continuance on old lines extremely improbable, if not altogether impossible. The
victories of Japan over Russia, the entry of Turkey among constitutionally-governed
countries, the awakening of China, the spread of the national movement in India,
Persia and Egypt, all point to the necessity of the West revising her conception of
the  East  –  revising  also  the  standards  by  which  she  has  sought  in  the  past  to
regulate her relations with the East74.
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34 The time had come to reset the power relations between ‘West’ and ‘East’ ‘on more
equal terms’ and for India to retrieve its centrality on the historical stage. It was the
beginning  of  that  process  of  rewriting  history  that  commonly  runs  parallel  to  the
process of nation-building. 
 
Conclusion
35 To conclude, the idea of the nation articulated by Gokhale was defined on the one hand
by the principles of the British liberal tradition and on the other hand in contraposition
to the illiberal British rule in India, which violated those same principles. Gokhale’s
conceptualisation of the nation was in sum a by-product of liberalism and its ‘other’. In
Gokhale’s thought, liberalism was a safeguard against the oppressive colonial state, but
it was also the catalyst for a radical social transformation against the internal evils of
Indian society. It was liberty of each individual, regardless of his or her race, religion,
class  or caste.  By adopting a political  idea of  nationhood which was opposed to an
ethnic one, Gokhale articulated a form of nationalism that celebrated differences vis-à-
vis  narrow  identities  and  challenged  the  concept  of  nationhood  –  quite  rooted  in
Europe by the end of the nineteenth century – according to which a country that did
not  possess  blood  and  cultural  bonds  could  not  aspire  to  be  a  nation.  This  same
argument  was  made  by  the  civilians:  India  was  a  subcontinent,  a  territory,  not  a
nation75. In short, the nation envisioned by Gokhale was inclusionary, individual-based,
forward-looking,  based  on  a  common  future  in  which  economic  and  social
discrimination would be finally overturned. It was predicated on an idea, rather than
on external symbols.  And exactly this was its weakness:  being too rational and far-
sighted, it did not arouse deep and compelling passions. So, Gokhale’s imagined nation
was less appealing than the one of other nationalist ideologues, such as Tilak, in whose
opinion, national consciousness had to revolve around the myth of a glorious Hindu,
brahmanical past. According to Tilak, the intrusion of Western ideas had corrupted the
ancient glory of India; the image of Shivaji was revisited and portrayed as that of a
Hindu  king  who  has  defeated  the  Muslims  “invaders”;  old  religious  festivals  were
reintroduced  in  a  new  mass-dimension  mould  and  politicised.  Thus,  Tilak’s
representation  of  the  Indian  nation  was  much  more  powerful,  since  it  had  the
immediate advantage of mobilising people by means of a language easily understood by
everyone. Nevertheless, it was divisive and dangerous, because it created a long-lasting
sense of distrust between the majority, namely the Hindus - the real Indians - and the
others. It was not liberal and, as such, did not advocate pluralism. Then, while fighting
for  freedom  from  the  British,  this  new  conceptualisation  of  nationalism  did  not
promote national unity76. On the contrary, the Gokhalean concept of the nation, with
its  strong liberal  component,  demonstrates that,  as  Christopher Bayly held,  “Indian
liberalism was both wider in scope, and more specific in its remedies,  than what is
commonly called nationalism77”.
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
15
NOTES
1. K.M. PANIKKAR, The State and the Citizen, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960 (first
pub. 1956), p. 102.
2. This theory was formulated in Giorgio BORSA, Le origini del nazionalismo in Asia
Orientale, (edited by G. C. Calza), Pavia, Università di Pavia, 1965, in Giorgio BORSA, La
nascita del mondo moderno in Asia Orientale. La penetrazione Europea e la crisi delle società
tradizionali in India, Cina e Giappone, Milano, Rizzoli, 1977, and in other works, among
which the ones I will make reference to below. I am particularly thankful to Professor
Michelguglielmo Torri, who has been personally benefitted by the scholarly advice of
Giorgio Borsa, for his willingness to discuss at length Borsa’s theory of modernisation. 
3. Benedetto CROCE, La storia come pensiero e come azione, Bari, Laterza, 1938, p. 5.
4. Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalismo, in Dizionario di Filosofia, A. Biraghi (ed.),Milano,
Comunità, 1957, p. 617-618.
5. See, among recent works, for example Annelien DE DIJN, French Political thought from
Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in a levelled Society, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2008 ; Jeremy JENNINGS, Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in
France since the Eighteenth Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011 ; Bryan 
GARSTEN (ed.), Rousseau, the Age of Enlightenment, and their Legacies, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2012 ; Marie FOURCADE, Ines G. ZUPANOV (ed.), L’Inde des Lumières.
Discours, Histoire, Savoirs (XVIIe-XIXe siècle), Editions de l’EHESS, 2013 ; Steven WALL (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
6. Eric HOBSBAWM, On History, London, Abacus, 1998 (first published 1997), p. 335.
7. Marie FOURCADE, Ines G. ZUPANOV, “Introduction. La question des Lumières en Inde : un
champ à revisiter ?”, in Marie FOURCADE, Ines G. ZUPANOV, L’Inde des Lumières, p. 13-49,
here p. 29.
8. Which, of course, leaves the question open of what Asia is. Asia is not even a valid
geographical expression, as pointed out by some geographers. See Martin W. LEWIS,
Kären WIGEN, The Myth of Continents. A Critique of Metageography, University of California
Press, Berkeley 1997. More importantly, Asia is not unified by a common culture/
civilisation. Between, e.g., Indian and Chinese civilisations the differences are as
profound, and maybe more, than the ones setting apart e.g. Indian and European
civilisation. A good starting point on this problem is William H. McNeill’s classical
work, The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1963. ‘Asian Values’, apart from being loosely based on Confucian
ideology, are nothing different from a politically motivated fabrication. 
9. The two historiographical schools often overlap in India. In fact, communism was
perceived as an ideology conducive to provide post-colonial countries with an
alternative kind of modernisation, distinct from the one offered by the capitalist mode
of production. [Giorgio BORSA, “Nationalism and the Beginning of Modernisation in
Eastern Asia/ Il Nationalismo e l’ingresso dell’Asia orientale nel mondo moderno”, Il
Politico (1964), p. 320-356, here p. 352]. 
10. Giorgio Borsa became promoter of a ‘rivoluzione storiografica copernicana’ that
questioned both the Eurocentric and Asiacentric historiographies [Giorgio BORSA, “Dalla
modernizzazione alla storia come conoscenza individuale”, Pluriverso, 4 (1996),
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
16
p. 116-127, here p. 117]. That his thesis is valid still today is confirmed by the fact that,
of late, eminent scholars of India around the world have started elaborated a similar
interpretation of the process of modernisation: Christopher A. Bayly, Sanjay
Subrahmanyam and Sugata Bose are just some notable ones.
11. Giorgio BORSA, La nascita del mondo moderno, p. 10.
12. Ibidem.
13. Sanjay SUBRAHMANYAM, Is Indian ‘Civilization’ a Myth?, Delhi, Permanent Black, 2013,
p. 6.
14. Eric HOBSBAWM, On History, p. 220.
15. See Michelguglielmo TORRI, Guido ABBATTISTA, Guido SAMARANI. “La nascita del mondo
moderno in Asia orientale, di Giorgio Borsa.”, Contemporanea 11 (1), 2008, p. 115-138,
here p. 117-119.
16. See for example the essay by Ayesha JALAL, “Striking a just balance: Maulana Azad as
a theorist of Trans-National Jihad.” in Modern Intellectual History, p. 95-107 and Parimala
V. RAO, Tilak’s Nationalism: Discrimination, Education and Hindutva, Delhi, Orient
Blackswan, 2010, infra.
17. Sharing certain ideological premises with the Marxists but focussing their analyses
less on politics than on literature, the Subaltern Studies historiographic school have
tried to give voice to the ‘fragments’ of the nation, the microstoria of the people who
had been left out by the nationalist narrative. Both Marxist and ‘Subaltern’ schools
repudiate liberalism as the core ideology of imperialism, as something cunningly
concealing the real nature of the colonial rule. Those Indian politicians and thinkers
who used liberal ideology to criticise the colonial government are regarded with
contempt as compradores of the regime, just willing to defeat the foreign domination
in order to replace them to the detriment of the common Indian man.
18. This attitude of the Indian nationalist historiography is countered by the apologetic
attitude towards imperialism and the revival of certain myths of the old colonial
historiography, which are distinguishing features of a not inconspicuous strand
especially in US and British historiography (see Niall Fergusson’s constant justification
of British and American imperialism).
19. For the post-independence Indian historiography see Michael GOTTLOB (ed.), 
Historical Thinking in South Asia. A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present, 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 1-87 and p. 217-284; Michael GOTTLOB, History and
Politics in Post-colonial India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2011, infra.
20. See Michelguglielmo TORRI, Regime coloniale, intellettuali e notabili in India. Politica e
società dell'era del nazionalismo, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1996, p. 19-61, in which the
author elaborates a sophisticated critique of the historiography of the Cambridge
school. Part of this critique is available in English. See Michelguglielmo TORRI,
“«Westernized Middle Class», Intellectuals and Society in Late Colonial India”, Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol . XXV, No. 4, 27 January 1990.
21. See the special issue of Modern Intellectual History, 4, 1 (2007); Christopher A. BAYLY, 
Recovering Liberties. Indian Though in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, Delhi, Cambridge
University Press, 2012; Sugata BOSE, A Hundred Horizons: the Indian Ocean in the Age of
Global Empire. Harvard University Press, 2009; Andrew S. SARTORI, Liberalism in Empire. An
alternative History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2014.
22. Christopher A. BAYLY, “Liberalism at Large: Mazzini and Nineteenth-century Indian
Thought”, in Christopher A. BAYLY, Eugenio F. BIAGINI (ed.), Giuseppe Mazzini and the
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
17
Globalisation of Democratic Nationalism (1830-1920), Oxford University Press for the British
Academy 2008, p. 355-374, here p. 355.
23. Shruti KAPILA, “Preface”, in Modern Intellectual History, p. 3-6, here p. 4.
24. Christopher A. BAYLY, Recovering Liberties..., op.cit., p. 173. In the words of B. B.
Majumdar, “it has been the British domination – and therein lies the peculiar merit of
it - that has slowly roused India to a new political consciousness. and once again after
six centuries, a development of political thought has taken place through criticism and
appreciation of the British administrative system in all its different and expanding
spheres, for that is the only way in which political thought can grow in a subject
country, as it grew in the subject medieval countries of Central Europe through
discussion of questions affecting the Papal and Empire governments” (in B.B. MAJUMDAR,
History of Indian Social and Political Ideas. From Rammohan to Dayananda (1821-84), Calcutta,
Bookland, 1967, p. V). This work, first published in 1934, was the last to deal with the
history of political thought in India for a long while.
25. Christopher A. BAYLY, Recovering Liberties, op.cit., p. 10.
26. Bangavasi, Calcutta, 2 January 1909, in Native Press Reports (NPR), National Archives
of India (NAI).
27. See ahead. 
28. Significantly enough, when the colonial government introduced English as the
language of higher education, it was mainly thanks to the initiative of Indians, often
with the individual support of few British liberals and missionaries, that English
schools were established (Rao, History of Indian Education, 20). See also Antonio RECUPERO,
“Macaulay, l’ “interpretazione whig della storia” e l’istituzione della lingua e
dell’istruzione inglese in India (1813-1835)”, in Le Carte e la Storia, 9.2 (2003), p. 47-57.
29. Kapil RAJ, “L'Orientalisme en Inde au tournant du XIXe siècle : La Réponse du
mondialisme britannique a l'universalisme de la Révolution francaise”, AHRF, 320
(2000), p. 89-99, here p. 92-93.
30. See Christopher A. BAYLY, “Rammohun Roy and the Advent of Constitutional
Liberalism in India, 1800-1830”, Modern Intellectual History, p. 25-41, infra. The theme of
constitutional monarchy as part of the political system of ancient India is recurring in
several future nationalist authors, especially after the discovery of the Chanakya’s 
Arthashastra. An example is the work of the historian K.P. Jayaswal (1871-1937)
published in the Modern Review of Calcutta [See Claude MARKOVITS, “L'Inde colonial :
nationalisme et histoire”, Annales (1982): p. 648-668, here p. 653].
31. They were active in the Bombay presidency where the influence of European ideas
had been felt very early thanks to the reform of the educational system introduced by
the governor Mountstuart Elphinstone (1819-27). Significantly, Ranade was the political
guru of Gopal Krishna Gokhale.
32. Aravind GANACHARI, Gopal Ganesh Agarkar: The Secular Rationalist Reformer, Mumbai,
Popular Prakashan, 2005, p. 19-20.
33. Sudharak (Reformer), “Social Evolution”, 16 October 1893.
34. Ibidem.
35. It is worth taking note of the fact that a process of restoration of orthodox,
brahmanical Hinduism ran parallel to the process of its reformation. As a matter of
fact, the aggressive discourse of Christian missionaries strongly contributed to make
the local religions feel jeopardised and threatened. The reaction of Hindu religious
reformers was the attempt to rationalise and simplify Hinduism, which had been until
then a polymorphous aggregate of many religious traditions rather than a
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
18
homogenous, monotheistic religion stricto sensu. Therefore, Hindu reformers selected
the system of thought of few Hindu traditions – generally those close to Brahmanical
worship because it was to brahmanical castes that these intellectuals belonged – in
order to provide Hinduism with elements of coherence and uniformity so that it could
turn into an authoritative and powerful counterweight to challenge the intrusiveness
of Christianity. Unfortunately, Muslims too became target of the new aggressive
posture acquired by Hinduism. Hindu militancy manifested itself also with a strong
proselytising action in order to reduce conversions to Christianity but also to bring
Hindus converted to Islam back to the fold of the new mould of Hinduism. Religion,
then, was transformed into a polarising factor between religious communities. So, for
example, the ban on cow-slaughter promoted by the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj
spurred tension and hostility between Muslims and Hindus. See Romila THAPAR, “
Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu
Identity”, Modern Asian Studies, 23 (2), May 1989, p. 209-231.
36. Rita D. SIL, “Images de la Revolution Francaise dans la Colonisation et la
Decolonisation en Inde”, in Michelle Vovelle (ed.), L’Image de la Révolution Française,
Pergamon Press, 1989, p. 1812-1822, here p. 1815.
37. That is why Gopal Krishna Gokhale cited Mill’s work on the representative
government, rather than On Liberty. See, for example, the speech delivered by Gokhale
in the Bombay Legislative Council on the Mofussil Municipalities Bill, February 1901, R.
P. PATWARDHAN, D. V. AMBEKAR (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Volume
2, Poona, Deccan Sabha, Asia Publishing House, 1966, p. 114-134, here p. 121.
38. As Nehru held in 1961, a secular state was “a state which honours all faiths equally
and gives them equally opportunities” [quoted in T.N. MADAN, “Secularism in Its Place”, 
The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46, N° 4 (Nov. 1987), p. 747-759, here p. 756].
39. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, London, Penguin 1968.
40. Uday Singh MEHTA, Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal
Thought, London, University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 140.
41. Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, op.cit., p. 172-173.
42. Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, op.cit., p. 133-149. See Edmund Burke,
"Speech on the State of Representation of Commons in Parliament”, in J.F. Taylor (ed.), 
Writings and Speeches, New York, Little Brown, 1901, (7), p. 94-95.
43. As a matter of fact, also in Burke’s thought there were elements of ambiguity. See
for instance the contribution by Sunil AGNANI, “India and Haiti as Colonial Spaces of the
Enlightenment”, in Marie FOURCADE, Ines G. ZUPANOV, L’Inde des Lumières, op.cit.,
p. 189-208. According to Agnani “Burke is sharply critical of the equivalent of the
“planters”, namely the East India Company officials who are viewed as akin to
revolutionary Jacobins, heedlessly transforming the social fabric of a society. But in the
West Indian context he is in league with this class of planters and fears what he calls
the “race of fierce barbarians” (namely, the West-African born soldiers and insurgents
of St. Domingue) who are allied with the French” (Ivi, p. 200-201). 
44. See also Prathama BANERJEE, “Time and Knowledge”, in Pradip Kumar DATTA, Sanjay 
PALKISHAR (ed.), Indian Political Thought, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 28-62,
here p. 56.
45. Bipan CHANDRA, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, Economic Policies of
Indian National Leadership 1880-1905, Delhi, Har-Anand Publication, 2010 (first published
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
19
1966), p. 639. See also K.M. PANIKKAR, In defence of liberalism, Bombay, Asia Publishing
House, 1962, p. 14.
46. Jayati GHOSH, “Dissenting Economists. The late nineteenth-century Indian
tradition”, in Claudio SARDONI, Peter KRIESLER (ed.), Keynes, Post-Keynesianism and Political
Economy, Essays in Honour of Geoff Harcourt, Vol. 3, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 94-109,
here p. 97-98.
47. Jayati GHOSH, “Dissenting Economists”, op.cit., p. 102.
48. Since the foundation of the Congress, its leadership decided that the pursuit of
social reforms was not responsibility of the party. Instead, the battle against social evils
had to be carried out by other organisations, such as, for instance, the Servants of India
Society, created by Gopal Krishna Gokhale. 
49. I have benefitted from the insightful and much-appreciated critical comments
made upon the first draft of this article by an anonymous reviewer who observed that
the way liberalism was adopted in, and adapted to, the colonial context by Indians was
very similar to French republicanism. In fact, the republican visions were more
insistent on equality and common good, and intermingled with democratic, liberal and
socialist perspectives. Compared to British liberalism, moreover, French liberalism had
a preference in articulating the defence of liberty grounding it on natural rights
instead of utilitarianism, something which was appealing to Indians. There is still much
that remains to be explored in this field. It could be argued that French republicanism
was significant to Indians because it was the ‘other of the other’ and could play an
important role in the political and intellectual needs of the anti-colonial discourse, in
the same way as Thomas Paine’s Common Sense and The rights of Man did. The political
thought of the French republicanism has kindled increasing interest in the past twenty
years. Among others, some recent works are: Mona OZOUF, “L’idée républicaine et
l’interprétation du passé national”, Annales, 53 (1998), p. 1075-87; Philip PETTIT, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1997; Jeremy JENNINGS, Iseult HONOHAN (ed.), Republicanism in Theory and Practice, London,
Routledge, 2005; Jeremy JENNINGS, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in
Contemporary France”, British Journal of Political Sciences, 30, 4 (2000), p. 575-598;. Nadia 
URBINATI, “Republicanism after the French Revolution: The Case of Sismonde de
Sismondi”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 73, 1(2012), p. 95-109. It would be interesting to
insert French Republicanism in the frame of global intellectual history, further
contributing to the work done by Marie FOURCADE, Ines G. ZUPANOV, L’Inde des Lumières, 
op.cit.
50. Speeches and Writings of Gokhale, Volume 2, p. XXVII. Italic added.
51. The Mahratta, “Elementary Education Bill objections answered. Hon. Mr Gokhale’s
speech”, 30 July 1911, p. 397-369.
52. This has been underscored very well by the work of Parimala V. Rao. See Parimala 
RAO (ed.), New Perspective on the History of Indian Education, Delhi, Orient Blackswan, 2014;
the above mentioned Tilak’s Nationalism: “A Century of Consolidation and Resistance.
Caste and Education in Maharashtra (1818-1918)”. History and Society, Occasional Paper
n.54, Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 2014. Gokhale always paid a great
deal of attention to social justice in his public speeches all over his political life. His
view was very progressive, as we can see from an excerpt of a lecture delivered in
Madras: “The humanitarian movement of the eighteenth century in the West has done
more for the people pf the West in some respects than ever their struggle for their
political freedom. if we understand correctly the value of the dignity of man as man, if
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
20
we understand the value of the social freedom, if we understand the injustices and the
disabilities placed upon any section on the score of birth and sex, if we understand all
these things correctly, if we are fired by that enthusiasm which always comes from a
keen sense of injustice, if we put our shoulders to the wheel and try to set some matters
right, then I say we shall have done something in the social and humanitarian sphere. A
beginning has been made and there is an awakening in this land such as there never
was. We are at any rate ashamed of many of the social injustices which we deplore on
all sides of us; only we do not take up with energy, necessary energy, the work to
remove those injustices” (Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Responsibilities of Public Life. A lecture
delivered by Mr. G.K. Gokhale in Madras, Madras, Sons of India, 1917, p. 4-5. This speech
was printed as part of the project promoted by Annie Besant and her Home Rule League
aimed at the political sensitisation of Indian people over some relevant social and
political issues.
53. Rao, History of Education, p. 36.
54. The best biography of Gokhale is Bal Ram NANDA, Gokhale: the Indian moderates and the
British Raj, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1977.
55. Gokhale Papers, NAI, From Gokhale to John Morley, 9th May 1897.
56. Friedrich LIST, The National System of Political Economy, London, 1885. List took part in
the debates of economic development in 1820s in the United States of America and was
inspired by Hamilton’s Outline of American Political Economy (Philadelphia, 1827). The
purpose of national economy in List’s opinion was to encourage capitalist
industrialisation. 
57. See “Import Duty on Sugar”, in R. P. PATWARDHAN, D. V. AMBEKAR (ed.), Speeches and
Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Poona, Deccan Sabha, Asia Publishing House, Vol, 1,
1962, 9th March 1911, p. 335.
58. See Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990, p. 30.
59. Although he never mentioned Asia in his writings, Mazzini became very popular in
India and his works were translated in several Indian languages. The reading of Mazzini
by Indian ideologues is very interesting and it shows how the thought of the Italian
nationalist was adopted by very different strands of Indian nationalism. See Gita 
SRIVASTAVA, Mazzini and his Impact on the Indian National Movement, Allahabad, Chugh
Publications, 1982 (especially chapters VII-X) and the more recent essay by Christopher
A. BAYLY, “Liberalism at large”. Mazzini’s conceptualisation of the nation was similar to
the one formulated by Ernest Renan, expressed by the latter in 1882 in the lecture
“Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” Here the French historian defined the nation as a ‘plébiscite
de tous les jours’ (See Ernest RENAN, Oeuvres complète, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1947,
p. 887-906, here p. 904). For Mazzini’s definition of the nation see Federico CHABOD, 
L’Idea di Nazione, Bari, Laterza 2011 (first published 1967), p. 80-91.
60. G. A. NATESAN (ed.), Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Madras, Natesan, 1920, p. 915.
This was the speech delivered in occasion of the inauguration of the Servants of India
Society, founded by Gokhale in 1905. The society had the purpose to unite and train
Indians in welfare work, so that the masses could be provided with elements of self-
elevation and be more readily included in the national project. The constitution of the
organisation (See Bal Ram NANDA, Gokhale…, op.cit, p. 169-176) was a real national
programme and the servants, a sort of political sanyasin, had to circulate Gokhale’s idea
of the nation.
61. Ivi, p. 914.
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
21
62. Speech on the Education Bill addressed by Gokhale in the Calcutta Town Hall on the
2nd September 1911, in D. G. KARVE, D. V. AMBEKAR (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Gopal
Krishna Gokhale, Volume 3, Poona, Deccan Sabha, Asia Publishing House, 1967, p. 244. 
63. Speech of Gokhale at the New Reform Club, 14th November 1905, in R. P. 
PATWARDHAN, D. V. AMBEKAR (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Volume 2,
p. 334.
64. Ibidem.
65. “Congress Presidential Address”, Benares 1905, in R. P. PATWARDHAN, D. V. AMBEKAR
(ed.), Speeches and Writings …, Volume 2, p. 190. 
66. R. Gordon MILBURN, England and India, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1918,
p. 18. See in particular the second chapter (p. 17-22), where the author reports a talk he
had with Gokhale.
67. R. Gordon MILBURN, England and India, op.cit., p. 18.
68. Speech by Gokhale at the New Reform Club, 14th November 1905, in Speeches and
Writings of Gokhale, Volume 2, p. 337.
69. Speech by Gokhale at the New Reform Club, 14th November 1905, in Speeches and
Writings of Gokhale, Volume 2, p. 337-339.
70. Gopal Krishna GOKHALE, “Welby Commission Written Evidence”, 1897, in R. P. 
PATWARDHAN, D. V. AMBEKAR (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Volume 1,
p. 488.
71. See David OMISSI, “India: Some Perceptions of Race and Empire”, in D. OMISSI, A. S. 
THOMPSON (ed.), The Impact of the South African War, Basingstoke, Palgrave 2001, ch. II;
especially p. 219-20, p. 27). 
72. “British Indians in South Africa”, article by Gokhale appeared on India, June 1897, 
Speeches and Writings of Gokhale, Volume 2, p. 399.
73. Ibidem.
74. Gokhale, “East and West in India”, paper read at the Universal Races Congress held
in London, in Speeches and Writings of Gokhale, Volume 2, July 1912, p. 380.
75. It is interesting to note that the argument made by the civilians was in contrast
with the English concept of the nation. In fact, in England, the idea of the nation in the
modern meaning of the term was predicated on territory. In other words, all those who
were born in England were members of the English nation. 
76. On Tilak see Richard I. Cashman, The myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and mass politics in
Maharashtra, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975; Parimala V. RAO, Tilak’s
Nationalism…, op.cit. For a comparison between Tilak and Gokhale see Stanley A. 
WOLPERT, Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India, Delhi,
Oxford University Press, 1989 (first published 1962).
77. Christopher A. BAYLY, Recovering Liberties, p. 1.
The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India
La Révolution française, 8 | 2015
22
ABSTRACTS
This essay wants to show how educated Indians appropriated and reshaped the liberal ideology
of their colonisers, the British, during the nineteenth century. Liberal ideas were adapted to a
situation utterly different from the European one and creatively combined with indigenous ideas.
This was part of a wider process of re-working European ideas in the light of Indian traditions in
order  to  formulate  an  autonomous  model  of  modernity.  Against  some  current  critiques  of
liberalism  which  see  it  as  the  ideological  ‘cover’  for  inequality  and  imperialism,  this  essay
attempts to show that, in the colonial context, Indian liberalism offered a powerful critique of
colonialism and emphasised collective identity and equality more than British liberalism did. The
example  of  Gopal  Krishna  Gokhale,  leader  of  the  Indian  National  Congress,  is  dealt  with  to
explain how certain Western ideas provided the foundation to elaborate an idea of the nation in
the modern meaning of the term.
Cet essai veut montrer comment les Indiens cultivés, au cours du XIXe siècle, se sont appropriés
et ont remodelé l’idéologie libérale de leurs colonisateurs britanniques. Les idées libérales ont été
adaptées à un contexte tout à fait différent de celui de l’Europe et combinées d’une manière
créative à la pensée autochtone. Cela faisait partie d’un processus plus vaste de reformulation des
idées  européennes  à  la  lumière  des  traditions  indiennes,  dans  le  but  de  créer  un  modèle
autonome  de  modernité.  Contre  certaines  critiques  contemporaines  du  libéralisme,  qui  le
considèrent comme une « couverture » idéologique des inégalités et de l’impérialisme, cet essai
tente de montrer comment le libéralisme a offert  une critique puissante du colonialisme,  en
soulignant tant les identités collectives que l’idée d’égalité (d’une manière bien différente de
l’idéologie libre-échangiste britannique). On a traité ici l’exemple de Gopal Krishna Gokhale, chef
du Congrès National Indien, pour montrer comment certaines idées occidentales ont fourni la
base pour élaborer, en Inde, une idée de Nation dans le sens moderne du terme.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Libéralisme, Idée de Nation, Nationalisme, modernité, Gokhale
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